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yoked for the failure of such corporation to comply with any subpoena issued pursuant to the prior Section.
Section 1105 originally required that the articles of dissolution contain a
statemnent that there were no suits pending against the corporation. This was
amended to provide that either this statement may be made, or, if a suit is pending,
a statement that adequate provision has been made for the satisfaction of any
judgment which may be obtained therein.
F. E. READER*

III.

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

a. The Penal Code
An Act of June 24, 1939,1 is entitled "An act to consolidate, amend, and
revise the penal laws of the Commonwealth." The title is misleading. The statute
affects the "criminal laws" rather than the "penal laws." It is limited in its
operation, with some minor exceptions, to the "substantive" as distinguished from
the "adjective" or "procedural" criminal law. It contains very little concerning the
general principles of the substantive criminal law which relate to all crimes, but is
almost exclusively composed of sections defining criminal acts and stipulating their
punishment. It does not deftne all of the crimes for which it stipulates a punishment, for, in many cases, it simply names a common law crime and provides that
it shall be punished in a certain way.
It does not define, nor even name, all of the acts which are crimes in Pennsylvania. Section 1101 expressly provides;
"Every offense now punishable either by the statute or common law of this
Commonwealth and not specifically provided for in this act shall continue to be
an offensc punishable as heretofore." The doctrine of "common law misdemeanors" is thus expressly retained as a part of the law of Pennsylvania, and it
is expressly recognized that there are many statutes, not a part of this Act, which
make various acts criminal.
The statute does "consolidate' 'the criminal laws of the Commonwealth by
collecting in one statute the various sections of the Penal Code of 1860 and its
amendments which were in force at the time of the, statute's enactment and many
other statutes of various degrees of importance, which never were a part of the
Code of 1860.
The statute "revises" the criminal laws by changing their phraseology. The
phraseology is somewhat archaic, for which, however, there is Blackstonian justification. As an aid, presumptively, to an understanding of the diction of the
1P. L. 872, 18 PURD. STATS. (Pa.)
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*Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law.
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statute, the third section of the Act2 is devoted to definitions. This is an orthodox device and, frequently, one of great usefulness. The merit of this particular
Section, however, is very questionable. It contains only twelve definitions, including "assignation," "carnal knowledge," and "prostitution." From the importance thus apparently given to these words, a reader might well surmise that
the crimina! laws of Pennsylvania relate, in a large measure, to irregular expressions of the genitive impulse. It is useful to have the words "person," "offense,"
and "whoever" defined in this preliminary Section, for these words are frequently
used in the other sections of the Act, but this is not true of the words "bucketshop," "escape," and "machine gun" which are also defined in this preliminary
Section.
The Act does not define the terms "felony" and "misdemeanor." It stipulates in each section that the crime therein defined or named shall be a "felony"
or a "misdemeanor," respectively. There were great objections to the former
classification in Pennsylvania of crimes as felonies and misdemeanors, both as to
the illogical manner in which crimes were assigned to one class or another and
also to the particular incidents attached to one or the other of the classes. The
present statute eliminates many but by no means all of these objections. One
may still ask why, if "whoever" fraudulently converts to his own use property
belonging to another is guilty of a felony,3 "whoever being a member of a partnership" fraudulently converts to his own use property of the partnership is guilty
6
5
of a misdemeanor only, 4 and why, if it is a felony to steal a contract, or a horse,
or electric equipment," it is only a misdemeanor to steal any kind of property
"growing or being on the land of another, or to steal coal by digging it from the
land ofanother.8
The Act provides that "treason" shall be a "f'elony." Prior to the statute,
treason was commonly so regarded, but was not so denominated.
The revision of the phraseology of the laws is, in some instances, indicative of carelessness. Thus, Section 301 provides that it shall be a felony for two
or more persons to "conspire or agree falsely and maliciously" to indict any person, while Section 302 provides that it shall be a misdemeanor for two or more
persons to "falsely and maliciously conspire and agree" to defraud any person.
Section 836 states that the crime of "false pretenses" is a felony and a few lines
later states that it is a misdemeanor. The Act provides that whoever "steals" a
bank bill, 9 "feloniously takes or steals" a motor vehicle'0 or "wilfully and unlaw2
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fully steals, takes or carries away" property growing upon the land of another"
shall be guilty of a crime.
Th'e statute' 2 provides that whoever endeavors to influence improperly public
officers shall be guilty of a misdemeanor the punishment for which shall be a fine
not exceeding $1000 or imprisonment not exceeding two years or both, and in the
next Section, provides that whoever follows the occupation or practice of doing
this shall be guilty of a misdemeanor the punishment for which sall be a fine not
exceeding $1.000 or imprisonment not exceeding Iwo years or both.
The section which defines the offense of compounding 13 enumerates the
specific offeases the compounding of which is criminal. This enumeration includes
a crime denominated as "house breaking," whatever that may be, and includes
"larceny" but does not include embezzlement or the obtaining of property by
false pretenses.
Thc statute provides that the punishment for "larceny" shall be a fine not
exceeding $2000 or imprisonment not exceeding five years or both 4 but that if
one steals a deed or lease or contract he shall be guilty of "larceny," the punishment for which shall be a fine not exceeding $1000 and imprisonment not exceeding five years or both," and that one who steals growing property shall be punished by a fin-e
not exceeding $2000 or imprisonment not exceeding 3 years, or both.
The statute provides that one who forges or counterfeits a public seal, and
that ore who is "concerned in forging and counterfeiting" a public seal shall be
guilty of a felony.
The section defining "voluntary escape" applies to any sheriff, coroner, keeper
of a jail, constable or other officer, but the section defining negligent escape applies to "any keeper, jailer, sheriff, or other officer, and the section punishing
aiding an escape refers to prisoners in the custody of any officer or other person.
The section defining perjury 16 has been rendered somewhat obscure by the
manner in which it is punctuated. It now reads that whoever corruptly makes false
written statements is guilty of perjury.
Section 326, in addition to naming and defining a crime and stipulating its
punishment, eloquently declares that the commission of the crime shall be deemed
a denial to the victim "of the equal protection of the law" and a violation of the
peace of the Commonwealth and an offense against the same.
Section -403 declares that "forcible entry" must be committed with "violence
and a strong hand or circumstances of terror," but Section 403 declares that
"forcible detainer" must be committed "by force and with a strong hand, or by
means of threats."
1
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Section 405, defining the offense of "disturbing public assemblies," attempts
to enumerate the purposes for which the assembly must have been convened in
order that the crime may be committed. Among the purposes enumerated are
"moral" and "floral."
Section 512 as printed is unintelligible, and Section 519, defining "public
indecency," not only requires that the act should be a "notorious act of public indecency," but that it tends to debauch the morals or manners of the people. The
inappropriateness of the phras-eology of many other sections may be discovered by
a most cursory reading.
The Act "amends" the criminal laws by making important changes in the
substantive criminal law. The Act provides that burglary may be committed by
entering, without breaking, any building, or any car, motor vehicle, trailer or aircraft, etc., at any time.
Section 703 simply provides that "whoever is convicted of voluntary manslaughter is guilty of a felony," without attempting to define voluntary manslaughter, but declares "whoever is convicted of involuntary manslaughter, happening in consequence of an unlawful act or the doing of a lawful act in an
unlawful way, is guilty of a misdemeanor." This definition of involuntary
manslaughter is different from that in the Act of 1860 and its amendments and
may require a different interpretation of the scope of the crime.
Most of the sections of the Act begin with the word "whoever." This word,
according to Section 103, includes a "copartnership, association and corporation."
A partnership, association, or corporation may therefore apparently be held criminally responsible for the crimes of rape, murder, larceny, burglary, etc. This is
an extension of the law as to the criminal responsibility of corporations beyond
what it was previously thought to be, and gives rise to speculation as to the procedure which is to be adopted in prosecuting an association or partnership for
crime, and how a corporation is to be punished for a crime the prescribed punishment for which is fine and imprisonment.
The Act provides that certain crimes shall be felonies which were previously
misdemeanors and that certain crimes shall be misdemeanors which were previously felonies. A change of this character produces important changes in the
law relative to arrest, costs, homicide, burglary, criminal participation, solicitation,
etc.
The Act, quite unfortunately, preserves the distinctions between larceny, embezzlement, and obtaining property by false pretenses. It contains many sections
providing punishment for embezzlement by specific classes of persons and also
contains a section which is general in its scope and seems to render the other sections unnecessary.
The Act provides that if upon an indictment for false pretenses it appears
that tbe crimc committed was larceny, the defendant shall not be acquitted, but
does not provide that one indicted for larceny shall not be acquitted if it appears
that the crimc which was committed was false pretenses or embezzlement.
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The Act enacts, as Section 628, the Uniform Fire Arms Act, and provides that
the Section may be cited as the Uniform Fire Arms Act, but there is no provision
as to how the Act itself may be cited.
The Act repeals many criminal statutes "absolutely," but provides that the
provisions of the Act shall not apply to offenses committed before its effective
date, but that such offenses shall be prosecuted under the provisions of the law in
force at the time the offense was committed, and that the enumerated acts shall
not be repealed in so far as they (a) relate to the jurisdiction to indict and try
offenses; or -(b) fix the limitation of time within which persons charged with
offenses may be indicted; or (c) relate to evidence or the competency of witnesses;
or (d) relate to search and seizure; or (e) relate to the return of transcripts of
cases; or (f) relate to the form and contents of indictments.
This form of a repealing clause may give rise to difficult questions as to the
necessity of incorporating in future compilations of the criminal laws the statutes
which are repealed.
W. H. HITCHLER*

b. Solicitation for Attorneys
The Act of 1939, P. L. 329,1 provides a method of exercising much needed
control over those attorneys and their associates who fail to appreciate the value
of ethical practice.
The Act provides2 that
"Any person not a member of the bar . . . who shall solicit or procure . . . a retainer, power of attorney or any agreement...
authorizing an attorney to perform . . . legal services, or who shall
solicit any person in this State to institute any suit for damages in
which the compensation of any attorney for instituting . . . such
suit, shall directly or indirectly, depend upon the amount of recovery
therein, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor ....
"
The punishment provided, upon conviction, is a fine of not more than $200,
or imprisonment for not more than two years.
The statute contains a proviso3 to the effect that
"The foregoing shall not prohibit any bona fide labor organization
from giving legal advice to its members in matters arising out of their
employment."
*Dean, Dickinson School of Law.
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